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Introduction 
 
ESDP
1
 has developed rapidly since its inception in 1999 with a total of 23 ESDP missions, 
including six military operations, conducted between 2003 and today. In this respect, it has been 
the larger Member States which have moved the policy forward politically and contributed the 
most operationally. Nonetheless, the development of ESDP has and will require more than the 
political will and military contributions of France, the UK and Germany. This is especially 
significant considering the differences in threat perception between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member 
States, particularly concerning Russia which could affect the development of ESDP. The 
relatively small size and scope of ESDP missions conducted thus far in addition to initiatives 
such as the EU Battlegroup Concept, which allows smaller states to take a leadership role, means 
that medium sized Member States can likewise take on a role in developing ESDP. Indeed in 
order for ESDP to truly represent the EU, it is vital that they do so. Therefore, as a vocal, medium 
sized country and the largest of the new EU member states in terms of size and military 
capabilities, who has come under pressure to do more to participate, Poland has the potential to 
make an impact on ESDP. Indeed it is essential that the country does so, in order to ensure that 
ESDP continues to evolve in accordance to Polish security and defence interests, including their 
desire for closer EU-NATO working relations and for ESDP to become more active in the 
Eastern neighbourhood.  
Nevertheless, as an Atlanticist, with a strong attachment to NATO’s Article Five 
guarantee underwritten by the Americans and concerns regarding Russian intentions in its 
immediate neighbourhood, Poland initially reacted sceptically to the creation and development of 
a European Security and Defence Policy. This pro-Atlanticist stance was highlighted during the 
2003 Iraq war when the Poles, as part of ‘new Europe’, supported their American allies. Despite 
this, 2003 also saw Poland begin to take an active part in ESDP, including in the discussions on 
the European Security Strategy (ESS) and participation in ESDP missions. This more realistic 
stance has gathered pace as Poland has looked to play an increasingly constructive role within 
ESDP. What is so surprising about Poland’s more positive outlook is that the country is 
participating in missions outside of its immediate defence interests, which at first sight conflicts 
with Polish threat perceptions and where the Poles believe force should be used.  
The aim of this article is therefore to analyse continuity and change in Poland’s security 
and defence views, how this has impacted upon Polish engagement in ESDP and consequently 
what the implications are for the development of ESDP. It does so through the use of two 
interconnected concepts: strategic culture and role theory. The former highlights the central role 
played by the interpretation of historical events in the formation of how a country’s policy-
makers view the use of force. It provides policy-makers with a range of beliefs, attitudes and 
norms concerning appropriate actions within the security and defence arena, which then 
subsequently shapes a country’s policy-makers’ conceptions towards defence issues. Role theory 
meanwhile considers the process by which a country’s policy-makers implement the country’s 
role conceptions. Within its framework of role conceptions, role expectations and role behaviour 
it provides a clearer understanding as to how a foreign policy actor will perform on the world 
stage. Thus it links policy outcomes with the beliefs, attitudes and norms displayed by the ruling 
elite. Whilst both approaches highlight continuity over change, the latter can still occur when 
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external factors challenge two or more aspects of a country’s role conceptions, which are based 
on its strategic culture, causing conflict between them.  
It is argued that change in Polish security and defence policy has occurred due to three 
main developments which have caused a conflict between key Polish role conceptions. First was 
the transformation of the international situation following 9/11 which underlined the new security 
threats. Interconnected with this have been increased international expectations on Poland to 
enhance its role in the military sphere. Indeed due to Poland’s allies’ reactions to the changed 
international environment, Poland has found itself having to participate in missions outside of its 
security interests in order to retain its role as a ‘reliable ally’ as seen in Iraq. Finally, Poland’s 
accession to the EU allowed the country to fully contribute to ESDP. Thus Polish decision-
makers’ pro-active view of military force combined with a desire for the country to be a ‘reliable 
ally’ and to be included in decisions affecting the country’s interests has ensured increased Polish 
participation in ESDP. This is despite the fact that the Poles’ threat perceptions and immediate 
defence concerns are focused on the neighbourhood.  
Finally, the article concludes that Poland’s shift in security thinking and increased support 
for the EU as a security actor in its own right, so long as it remains within the civil-military 
domain, thus leaving the hard security components to NATO, has positive implications for the 
development of ESDP. In particular, Polish acceptance of ESDP highlights that despite 
divergences between Polish approaches to security and those of other Member States, particularly 
in relation to conceptions of Russia, where force should be used and multilateralism, active 
participation and even a leadership role at the EU level is possible. This underlines the possibility 
that the beginnings of a European strategic culture can be seen, one which is based upon a 
comprehensive view of security, thus stressing a civil-military role. Most importantly, Poland’s 
positive approach acts as a role model for other Member States to increase their contributions, 
turning ESDP into more than a German, French and British exercise.  
  
Constructing an analytical approach to explore Poland’s security and defence policy 
orientation 
 
As stated in the introduction, strategic culture and role theory will form the analytical foundation 
of this article. Both are subsets of foreign policy analysis and are based on the premise that 
foreign and security policies are ‘socially constructed’.2 Strategic culture relates to the beliefs, 
attitudes and norms concerning the use of force, held by a security community which has had a 
‘unique historical experience’.3 It is the interpretation of these historical events which is key to 
the understanding and advancement of strategic culture. The development of a ‘strategic culture’ 
takes place over a period of time and is highly stable as values, beliefs and the way they are 
interpreted become embedded and reinforced in society.
4
 It can however be subject to change, 
usually in reaction to events in the external security environment, although it is not necessarily 
the case that change will automatically arise. This is because strategic culture once socialised is 
difficult to change as it is also institutionalised.
5
 It should also be noted that strategic culture 
shapes a country’s security policy preferences, rather than ranking the various available options. 
Thus behaviour is an integral part of strategic culture as opposed to being separated from it.
6
 
Finally, concentration on strategic culture highlights that a relatively narrow definition of a 
country’s security policy which encompasses solely military aspects is taken here, as opposed to 
a wider definition encompassing non-military attributes.
7
 In the Polish case, this is necessary as 
military issues still form the core of Polish perceptions of security and it is therefore more salient 
to analyse continuity and change concerning the country’s views on the use of force.  
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 Nonetheless, whilst strategic culture is a valid tool to use when assessing what a country’s 
security and defence policy is founded upon and how this might impact upon how a country’s 
policy-makers choose to act, it is difficult to ascertain how this reaches or influences the EU or 
international levels. Thus, role theory will be used in order to activate strategic culture, whilst at 
the same time encompassing other factors which are of importance to the way in which a country 
defines its role. These include international expectations and a country’s position vis-à-vis the 
EU. Therefore the utility of role theory is in the depth of understanding that it provides as to how 
certain beliefs and attitudes find expression in a country’s security and defence policy and which 
elements of a country’s role set provides policy-makers with guidance for action in various 
situations in the international environment. 
Role theory comprises role expectations (the role(s) that an external actor believes another 
actor should play), role conceptions (the role(s) a foreign policy actor believes it should play) and 
role performance (the role(s) which are played).
8
 Role conceptions in particular are extremely 
persuasive in shaping a country’s security and defence policy as they incorporate a country’s 
strategic culture in addition to other factors such as a country’s status vis-à-vis the EU. They can 
be defined as ‘the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decision, commitments, 
rules and actions suitable to their state and of the functions, if any their state should be 
performing on a continuing basis in the international system’.9 Indeed strategic culture provides 
the foundation for the development of a country’s role conceptions as it acts as a lens through 
which all beliefs, attitudes and norms have to be filtered.  
International expectations meanwhile only have a minor influence on a country’s security 
and defence policy.
10
 This is because its policy is culturally rooted in its strategic culture. 
Nonetheless, international expectations can in turn produce role conflicts because they can impact 
upon core components of a country’s strategic culture which can lead to a shift in a country’s role 
conceptions. Hence role expectations are crucial when investigating change in a country’s role. In 
essence role expectations, role conceptions and role performance combine to form a role set, 
which includes various roles that a country holds, although these are not always complimentary. 
As long as conflicting roles are used in different circumstances there is no conflict. It is when 
different dominant conceptions of role collide in the same policy area that there is the potential 
for role change. However the circumstances in which roles are used can change, which 
automatically impacts upon those roles. In particular this concerns changes in the international 
environment as roles are initiated and developed within specific contexts. Thus, when the 
international situation changes a country’s role(s) can be placed in conflict. When conceptions of 
role collide then this usually indicates that parts of a strategic culture are also in conflict due to 
the linkage between the two.  
 
Activating the Analytical Framework: Polish Strategic Culture and Initial Role Set 
  
In order to activate the analytical framework outlined above four categories will be used which 
underline the key issues within European security and defence: threat perception, the use of force, 
multilateralism and the rule of law and the EU as an independent security and defence actor. 
Through an assessment of continuity and change in Polish views towards these areas it will be 
possible to assess what leadership role (if any) Poland wishes to take on and how in turn this will 
impact on ESDP. Finally, only the views of policymakers will be taken into consideration rather 
than public opinion as a whole, as it is the elites who are central to forming a country’s security 
and defence policy and their views are therefore more relevant as well as accessible.
11
 In addition 
it is possible to interview them, which forms the foundation of this research.  
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Domestic politics will, however, not form part of the assessment. Once a country’s 
strategic culture has been formed it is extremely difficult to change and when change does occur 
it will be incremental and in reaction to external sources which cause conflict within a country’s 
role conceptions, of which strategic culture forms a part. Indeed there has been agreement on the 
main tenets of Polish security and defence aims across the political spectrum as will be 
highlighted throughout this article. Poland’s changing view towards ESDP began slowly to 
change within the Buzek led AWS government which was in power from 1997 to 2001 and this 
continued within the 2001-2005 parliamentary term. Whilst there was a change of Prime Minister 
from Leszek Miller to Marek Belka (both of whom were from the left wing SLD) and cabinet in 
2004 (although it should be noted that no election was held), Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
continued as Foreign Minister and Szmajdziński as Minister of Defence. The pragmatic approach 
which was built up during this period continued under the more EU critical right wing Law and 
Justice led government which came to power in 2005 under the leadership of Lech Kaczyński 
who replaced Kwaśniewski as President and Jarosław Kaczyński who eventually became Prime 
Minister in 2006.
12
 Finally the current centre-right Civic Platform government led by Donald 
Tusk which came to power in 2007 has continued Poland’s active participation in ESDP. Whilst 
Tusk’s government is more pro-EU than its predecessor, change has occurred in style rather than 
substance.
13
 
 In order to analyse continuity and change in Poland’s approach to security and defence it 
is first necessary to outline the key tenets of the country’s strategic culture. This is founded on its 
history of heroic defeat and its status as a victim of Realpolitik.
14
 In particular the Poles betrayal 
by their allies at Yalta in 1945 is especially significant and has led to the Polish belief that the 
country should be a dependable ally, it should support the principle of self-determination and that 
Poland should always participate in decisions concerning its interests.
15
 This has resulted in the 
country’s pro-Atlanticist orientation and a fixation with NATO and its Article Five security 
guarantee, underwritten by the Americans, as well as a proclivity to use force.
 
Essentially, 
Poland’s European allies had failed at every point to support and protect the country against 
invasion in 1939 and this scepticism regarding the European’s security and defence competence 
remained.  
Polish strategic culture then feeds into a number of security and defence roles which 
subsequently shaped the country’s approach to security and defence issues. These are outlined 
here in order to provide the foundation on which to assess Polish reactions to the creation and 
initial development of ESDP which shall be advanced in the next section. First, Poland can be 
seen as an American ‘protectee’ and ‘territorial defender’. The latter is focused on the defence of 
Poland in case of invasion primarily by Russia which continued to be viewed as a threat to Polish 
independence. This led to the former whereby only the US was trusted to protect Poland’s 
security if necessary. Connected with Poland’s threat perception roles are its use of force roles as 
a ‘reliable ally’ and using force pro-actively. Despite the centrality of NATO and the US in 
Polish security, highlighting the country’s ‘Atlanticist’ role conception, Poland was still a 
‘sceptical multilateralist’. Although this role might seem surprising, considering the emphasis 
placed on the ‘return to Europe’ through EU and NATO membership, it relates more specifically 
to the UN. Due to Poland being let down by their allies such a multilateral organisation, 
representing differing values, was seen sceptically. Finally, in recognition of the importance of 
Eastern Europe to Polish security, the Poles looked to play the role of promoter of regional 
cooperation so as not to become a buffer zone or security grey area. Indeed Poland has been 
portrayed as a regional leader in the east, with the potential to shape Europe’s security and 
defence policy.
16
 However as will be seen, Polish decision-makers have downplayed this role.  
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The roles identified above (American ‘protectee’, ‘territorial defender’, ‘reliable ally’, 
pro-active regarding the use of force, ‘sceptical multilateralist’, ‘Atlanticist’ and promoter of 
regional cooperation) have combined to form a role set. This shaped Poland’s security and 
defence perspectives and thus the Poles’ reaction to ESDP. It should be noted that changes in the 
external environment or in a country’s international standing do not necessarily conduce a 
country to alter their security and defence policy. Rather it is how these changes are interpreted 
which is of significance. In Poland’s case, the new international situation, which has brought 
about new threats and ways of dealing with them, has challenged key aspects of Poland’s security 
and defence policy and has brought key roles into conflict with each other. As will be 
highlighted, this combined with increased role expectations from Poland’s allies and the 
country’s own change in circumstances due to membership of the EU has led to incremental 
adaptation in the country’s security and defence policy which has impacted upon the role it 
wishes to play in ESDP.  
 
Poland’s initial views on ESDP: From scepticism to pragmatism  
 
The foundations of ESDP can be seen in the Anglo-Franco St Malo declaration of December 
1998 although its formal creation at the EU level occurred at the Cologne European Council in 
June 1999; three months after Poland had joined NATO in March 1999. It arose out of a finely 
balanced compromise which brought together ‘Europeanist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ visions of security. 
Nonetheless, there is continuing divergence between the Member States regarding how ESDP 
should work with NATO in addition to disagreements concerning when, where and how force 
should be used. ESDP has also been hindered by a lack of military capabilities, held back by 
Member States’ static or declining defence budgets and political willingness which have arisen 
out of this incoherence concerning the direction of ESDP.  
  The Atlanticist orientated UK had agreed to the creation of ESDP as a response to US 
calls for Europe to take up the responsibility of its own regional security and thus ESDP was seen 
as strengthening rather than weakening the alliance. Combined with this was the realisation that 
the EU needed to strengthen its capacity to act following Kosovo. Despite these arguments, 
Poland’s leaders initially reacted extremely sceptically to ESDP. They were particularly 
concerned that ESDP would challenge NATO, alienate the US and in turn give Russia more 
influence. Additionally, Poland’s leaders were worried that ESDP would exclude non-EU 
European NATO members in an area which was crucial to the continent as a whole.
17
 As Kuźniar 
underlines ‘for a state, which was not a European Union member, and which had just obtained 
NATO membership – predominantly thanks to Washington’s pressure in favour of enlargement – 
the situation became extremely uncomfortable’.18 Thus Poland’s policy-makers’ response 
followed that of the US.19 This initial scepticism has gradually been replaced with a more realistic 
assessment of the policy. As the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cimoszewicz, highlighted 
ESDP ‘should be able to provide the means necessary for combating terrorism and help preserve 
the commitment of the United States to the security of its European allies’.20 Poland’s policy-
makers therefore suggested the 15+6 framework which brought together the fifteen EU Member 
States and the six non-EU European NATO states into a forum in which they could discuss 
European security and defence issues.21  
  However, prior to accession, Poland’s leaders still needed to be convinced about the 
rationale behind ESDP. Indeed, Poland’s inclusion or otherwise, shaped the country’s policy-
makers’ approach to certain ESDP initiatives. In particular, the Poles were sceptical of 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ which was initially incorporated into the Constitutional 
Treaty. As the current Polish Defence Minister Bogdan Klich stated in an interview ‘we were 
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indeed a bit hesitant in the first round of the constitutional debate on permanent enhanced 
cooperation because we found ourselves faced with a concept of a ‘select’ club, with just a few 
participating states’.22 Thus Polish policy-makers were fearful that the country would be 
‘excluded’. In addition there was the concern that permanent structured cooperation would result 
in collective defence, leading to duplication with NATO’s core function.23 The other item which 
could also have caused problems for Poland was the solidarity clause. Nonetheless, Polish policy-
makers’ reaction was practical though scepticism remained. As the then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Cimoszewicz stated in 2003, ‘Poland would accept a solidarity clause in the Treaty, in 
case of a terrorist attack, nevertheless limited to dealing with its effects on the territory of a 
member state. Finding the security of all member states indivisible, Poland has serious 
reservations about the idea of closer co-operation in ESDP’.24 Yet, as Kuźniar highlights ‘Polish 
fears diminished in the course of the evolution for the project and the establishment of regular 
contacts between the European Union and NATO. Towards the end of 2000, Warsaw remained 
dissatisfied with the extent of her participation  in work concerning ESDP (...) Nonetheless, an 
essentially positive attitude was expressed by Poland’.25  
  Thus, Poland’s Atlanticism, highlighted through its role as American ‘protectee’ 
combined with its ‘outsider’ status coloured the country’s policy-makers’ response to ESDP. As 
such, Poland was sceptical of the EU as an independent security and defence actor. Whilst 
politically this can be highlighted through the Poles’ response to the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), militarily there was an evolving pragmatism in Polish policy-makers’ stance towards 
ESDP, demonstrated through Polish participation in ESDP missions.  
 
Poland and the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
 
Polish apprehensions regarding ESDP can be emphasised through the changes that Poland 
suggested to the ESS in 2003 which were focused on regional security and EU-NATO relations. 
In relation to the former the Poles highlighted that Russia should be mentioned as a potential 
source of instability in addition to a possible international partner, they wanted more emphasis on 
traditional security threats and they did not want Ukraine placed besides Belarus as a country, 
which threatened instability.
26
 Whilst their suggestion regarding traditional security was included, 
although they were not the only ones to raise this issue, their concerns regarding Russia were not 
incorporated. Meanwhile, Ukraine, Belarus as well as Moldova were removed altogether. In 
regards to EU-NATO relations, they wanted more emphasis placed upon NATO, which was not 
included. As such the ESS did not completely reflect Poland’s security stance. It failed to fully 
emphasise more traditional defence tasks and highlighted a greater role for the EU in 
international security tasks in contrast to Poland’s more regional focus on its security. Evidently, 
these suggestions emphasise Polish strategic culture and security and defence roles as an 
American ‘protectee’, territorial defender as well as highlighting the importance of Polish 
relations to countries on its eastern border.  
  Considering the above, the response in Poland to the ESS was muted. Therefore, whilst 
the ESS was uncontroversial, likewise there was little that really corresponded to the Poles’ own 
vision of their security. Polish policy-makers did not have a global vision of the countries’ 
defence interests mainly because the country has never had an overseas empire. Therefore its 
global defence interests in places such as Africa are limited. This contrasts with the ESS which 
gives the EU a global security vision. Additionally the ESS’ emphasis on effective 
multilateralism suggests a stronger connection to organisations such as the UN than is the case in 
Poland. Interestingly though, the Poles did accept the original phrase ‘pre-emptive engagement’ 
contained within the ESS draft,
27
 highlighting their pro-activeness towards the use of force. 
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However, it should also be remembered that they were at the time, participating in the US’ 
‘coalition of the willing’ in the invasion of Iraq, highlighting the Poles’ role as a dependable ally.  
  Despite the indifferent reaction, the ESS has clearly had an influence on Poland's own 
security strategy, as the authors of the 2003 National Security Strategy (NSS) were the same as 
those who submitted Poland's input into the ESS draft.
28
 Although new security threats such as 
international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states have 
been included these exist alongside older threats. As is stated in the NSS ‘the changes in our 
security environment essentially consist in a shift of emphasis away from the classical risks 
(armed invasion) that decrease in importance and towards the unconventional risks (…) 
However, monitoring the situation for any resurgence of conventional risks also remains a valid 
priority’.29 Another area of convergence relates to the holistic nature of security which is central 
to the ESS and which also appears in Poland’s NSS. However, the NSS underlines the absolute 
importance of NATO to Polish security and that complementarity between the organisations is 
essential.
30
 The question is how far the ESS has helped to widen Polish security and defence 
interests as the new international situation demanded and whether divergences between the EU 
and Polish levels are narrowing.  
 
Poland’s early military involvement in ESDP 
 
Whilst politically, the ESS and Polish security and defence interests did not always coincide, this 
did not prevent Polish policy-makers from supplying personnel to ESDP missions. Of the four 
missions which were deployed prior to Polish accession (EU Police Mission (EUPM) Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Operation Concordia – FYR Macedonia, Operation Artemis – DR Congo and 
EUPOL Proxima – FYR Macedonia), the Poles took part in all but Artemis. Whilst the numbers 
sent were small, Poland still contributed more than any other accession country.
31
 Clearly Polish 
policy-makers’ commitment to ESDP missions has been directed towards the Balkans as opposed 
to the Congo, as the country’s security interests are concentrated on the neighbourhood.  
 Another area where Poland contributed positively was to the Force Catalogue in 2000. 
The Polish input included 500 personnel, half a brigade, one aircraft, two helicopters and two 
ships.
32
 This compared favourably with the other two central and eastern European countries who 
were members of NATO but not the EU: the Czech Republic (500 personnel, one 
nuclear/bacteriological/chemical battalion, one infantry battalion, one field hospital, two aircraft 
and two helicopters) and Hungary (250 personnel and one mechanised infantry battalion).
33
 The 
question remains – why did Polish policy-makers contribute to a policy which they were 
politically sceptical about? There are two reasons behind this. First was the importance of the EU 
for Poland’s identity and economic prosperity. However Poland’s European credentials were 
being called into question due to Polish participation in the Iraq war. Thus Polish policy-makers 
wanted to prove that the country was a reliable ally to its European partners.
34
 The second reason 
was to ensure that Polish security perspectives were taken into consideration, including the 
central importance of EU-NATO compatibility and that ESDP did not discriminate against the 
non-EU European NATO members. Thus Polish role conceptions ensured the country’s policy-
makers participated in a policy which was still seen sceptically prior to accession.  
  
Continuity and Change in Poland’s Approach to Security and Defence Issues 
 
The section above has outlined Poland’s initial sceptical but pragmatic approach to ESDP. 
Essentially the newly created ESDP was seen within the context of NATO rather than as a policy 
in its own right. However Polish policy-makers’ opinions on ESDP have shifted as Poland went 
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from candidate country to full member, which allowed the Poles to have a full say in decisions 
affecting their interests. The Poles’ emphasis on playing an active role in ESDP has ensured a 
change in some of the views concerning Polish security and defence interests, although 
reservations on a number of important issues remain. This section will outline where change has 
occurred and why in other areas continuity can be seen.  
Threat perceptions 
 
The fast changing international situation following 1989 and then 9/11, which reinforced the new 
security threats, has changed the way in which Poland’s allies such as the US view security 
issues. Thus Poland’s roles as American ‘protectee’ and territorial defender were placed under 
continued pressure as the Poles were expected to take on the new security tasks. Whilst these 
have been incorporated into Poland’s 2003 and 2007 National Security Strategies, they failed to 
undermine old security threats. Essentially, Polish threat perceptions are concentrated on the 
neighbourhood and in particular Russia. As Cichocki states, ‘Russia will attempt to expand its 
influence in East Central and Eastern Europe. (…) The question is whether our partner countries 
see this risk and are prepared to fulfil their obligations to provide for our security’.35 However, 
concerns over Russian influence referred more to energy security than to any immediate military 
threat. As the Polish 2007 NSS states ‘the dependence of the Polish economy on supplies of 
energy resources – crude oil and natural gas – from one source is the greatest external threat to 
our security’.36 There have also been concerns over instability and unpredictability of 
development in Russia as well as Russian behaviour regarding democracy in Ukraine.
37
  
 Considering the importance of neighbourhood security concerns, NATO’s Article Five 
guarantee, underwritten by the Americans continued to be placed centre stage. As the previous 
Foreign Minister, Anna Fotyga stated ‘we steadfastly promote the view that the North Atlantic 
alliance should remain an effective instrument of collective defence, while being fully capable of 
confronting new threats. We want continuation of the American engagement in Europe, as a 
guarantee of security and politico-military stability on the continent’.38 The significance of 
NATO’s Article Five guarantee is also highlighted in Poland’s National Security Strategies 
highlighting broad consensus on the country’s security and defence policy among Polish policy-
makers.  
 NATO’s Article Five guarantee has however come up for discussion in the context of 
NATO’s new strategic concept. Kamp highlights the main areas of disagreement between the 
Member States where NATO’s role is concerned including, most importantly in the Polish 
context, the balance between NATO’s territorial defence role and its expeditionary operations 
and maintaining the credibility of Article Five.
39
 In the case of the former, the argument revolves 
around those who want NATO to concentrate more on the Euro-Atlantic area, particularly after 
the Georgia crisis and those, such as the UK and the US, who want NATO to intervene and 
integrate globally and to acknowledge more explicitly today’s global threats including such 
issues as cyber terrorism.
40
 Poland evidently falls into the first camp. As the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Sikorski states, ‘NATO should recover its traditional role not just as an Alliance but as a 
military organization, and once again devote a portion of its energy to the treaty area’.41 In this 
respect, Polish policy-makers want to see a balance between Article Five tasks and expeditionary 
missions. In relation to the latter, Polish policy-makers also want the Article Five guarantee to be 
made more credible. Sikorski comments that ‘we need contingency planning that is not 
immobilized or guttered by political correctness. We need to make the NATO guarantee credible 
again’.42 Whilst the Poles accept that NATO should engage in stabilisation missions outside the 
Euro-Atlantic area, this should not deflect from the importance of Article Five and steps should 
be taken to ensure its credibility. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld is a 
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member of the group of 12 “wise men”, which has been set up under the leadership of former US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to draft NATO’s strategic priorities; Polish views will be 
well represented. 
 Despite a seeming conflict between Poland’s policy-makers’ focus on old security threats 
and the ESS’ concentration on new security tasks, this has not prevented the Poles from taking up 
an increasing military role in ESDP. This is partly because Polish policy-makers’ concerns 
encompass hard rather than soft security tasks as seen with the Poles’ stance on Article Five. 
Whilst the country still sees the Americans as guarantors of Poland’s security, Polish threat 
perceptions have widened. Hence the role of territorial defender has shifted towards a territorial 
defender ‘plus’ role, whereby both new and old threats are taken into consideration but the focus 
is placed on the country’s neighbourhood and particularly the potential threat from Russia as a 
regional de-stabiliser. Essentially, the Poles find it easier to see the rationale behind actively 
engaging in their neighbourhood in comparison to Africa for example and are not as focused on 
the new security tasks as these are not seen to be as important for Poland’s security and territorial 
integrity.  
 
The use of force 
 
As highlighted above, Polish policy-makers have a pro-active view regarding the use of force, 
especially when supporting their allies. This can be seen through Polish participation in NATO 
missions (see table 1). However it was Polish participation in the US’ coalition of the willing in 
Iraq which emphasised Polish policy-makers’ desire for the country to be seen as a dependable 
ally and as Cimoszewicz highlighted ‘one of the most important partners of the USA in 
Europe’.43 Whilst Polish policy-makers see the use of force as a last resort, the threshold is lower 
than for countries with stricter definitions such as Germany. The country’s stabilisation role was 
underlined in the 2003 NSS as enhancing ‘Poland’s international standing and will add to 
Poland’s prestige and image as a responsible and dependable partner on the international 
scene’.44 Thus Poland’s role as a reliable ally has ensured that the Polish armed forces are 
deployed wherever in the world they are needed irrespective of the country’s immediate defence 
interests. Despite Poland’s dependability which was rewarded with the control of one of the Iraqi 
zones, this did not bring about the rewards that had been expected. As Melamed states, 
‘expectations –many of them overly optimistic – ranged from loosened visa restrictions on Polish 
citizens, economic investment opportunities for Polish companies in Iraq and international 
recognition of Poland as a regional power enjoying a “special relationship” with the US’.45 This 
has led to a more realistic approach to Polish-US relations. 
 
Table 1 - Polish Participation in ESDP, NATO and UN Military Missions
46
 
 
ESDP Military 
Missions 
Year Total number of 
personnel 
Polish personnel 
Operation Concordia 
– FYR Macedonia 
March-December 
2003 
400 17 – 6th largest 
contributor 
EUFOR Althea – 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
December 2004 to 
present 
7000 personnel in 2004 
to 2500 personnel by 
the end of 2007 
2005 – 226 
Before February 2007 
- 195  
2009 - 203  
8
th
 largest contributor 
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EUFOR Congo June-November 
2006 
2300 130 - joint 3
rd
 largest 
contributor 
EUFOR 
TCHAD/RCA 
January 2008- 
March 2009 
3700 400 - joint 2
nd
 largest 
contributor 
NATO Missions    
IFOR December 1995 – 
December 1996 
60,000 670 
SFOR – Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
December 1996-
2004 
1996 – 31,000 
Early 2001 – 19,000 
End 2002 – 12,000 
2004 – 7,000 
1997 - 500  
December 2000 - 289   
AFOR - Albania April-September 
1999 
8,080   140 
KFOR – Kosovo 1999 – present 1999 – 50,000 
Early 2002 – 39,000 
June 2003 – 26,000 
End 2003 – 17,500 
2010 - 10,713  
545 in 2000 reduced 
to the current level of 
320 personnel 
ISAF - Afghanistan 2001-2003 – 
‘coalition of the 
willing’ operating 
under a UN peace-
enforcement 
mandate 
August 2003 to 
present – under 
NATO command 
2003 – 5,000 
Beginning 2006 – c. 
10,000 
Summer 1996 – c. 
20,000 
January 2007 – 35,460 
February 2008 - 43250  
February 2009 - 55100 
February 2010 – 85,795 
January 2007 - 160  
February 2007 - 943 
February 2008 - 1100  
February 2009 - 1590  
February 2010 - 1955 
Active Endeavour – 
Mediterranean  
 
2001 to present 2001 – 9 ships 
2002 – 11 warships and 
a submarine 
July-November 2008 
– 1 Oliver Hazard 
Perry-class frigate 
November 2008 – 
Polish Kobben-class 
submarine. 
UN Missions    
United Nations 
Disengagement 
Observer Force 
(UNDOF) – Golan 
Heights 
31 May 1974 to 
present 
December 2001 – 1036 
December 2005 – 1047 
December 2008 - 1039 
December 2009 – 1043  
December 2001 – 356 
December 2005 – 343 
December 2008 – 337 
December 2009 - 2 
United Nations 
Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
March 1978 to 
present 
December 2001 – 3639 
December 2005 – 1989 
December 2008 - 12435 
December 2009 – 
11,862  
December 2001 – 481 
December 2005 – 212 
December 2008 – 492 
November 2009 - 222 
December 2009 - 0 
UN Mission in the 
Central African 
Republic and Chad 
25 September 2007 
to present 
December 2008 – 279 
March 2009 – 2303 
December 2009 - 2777 
February 2009 - 2 
March 2009 - 315 
December 2009 - 17 
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(MINURCAT) 
 
  Polish policy-makers have to a certain extent been pursing the same strategy in ESDP. As 
highlighted above, Poland participated in three out of the four ESDP missions which took place 
prior to Polish accession. The country’s active engagement in ESDP has continued as highlighted 
through the country’s military participation in a number of ESDP missions (see table 1). As can 
be seen, whilst the Poles’ commitment to ESDP was initially concentrated on the Balkans, their 
activeness has geographically broadened to areas where the country has few immediate defence 
interests. The question is whether sending 130 troops to Congo and 400 troops to Chad proves 
that Poland’s political elites are moving away from the country’s regional defence focus or not?  
Although this demonstrates the Poles’ good will and European solidarity, it can also be seen as a 
political investment.
47
 Essentially ESDP could be needed for possible contingencies and so there 
is a need to build a link for reciprocity.
48
 In essence, if Poland participates in a mission which is 
in other countries’ interests, then there is the expectation that when a potential mission comes up 
in Eastern Europe that these countries will be more in favour of participation.
49
 This highlights 
the Poles’ emphasis on neighbourhood security and their desire for ESDP to be more active in 
this area, particularly in Moldova and the Balkans,
50
 where Poland can add value and which has a 
larger impact on the country’s security. However Poland’s commitment to ESDP should be seen 
in the context of the EU’s continued activity in Eastern Europe, particularly vis-à-vis Russia. If 
Poland’s views in this area are not taken into consideration or if the EU does not appear to be 
engaging in Eastern Europe then Poland’s support might weaken. Whilst there appears to be little 
change in Polish perceptions towards where force should be used, other factors in Polish security 
and defence policy have come into conflict with this narrow definition. In particular being a 
reliable ally is key and if Poland is to meet the expectations of its partners then being ready to 
participate in missions outside of the country’s neighbourhood is essential. This combined with 
‘nothing about us without us’ has served to override the Poles’ territorial defender ‘plus’ role 
conception.   
 
Multilateralism and the rule of law 
 
Poland is a sceptical multilateralist, as previously highlighted, although Polish policy-makers are 
focused on reforming the UN and in particular the Security Council. In regards to global security, 
multilateralism was seen more as a guiding approach and if the Poles considered the situation 
serious enough, the country would act in concert with its allies without a UN resolution. Thus a 
UN mandate is not compulsory for action although as far as possible one should be obtained.
51
 
Despite this scepticism, effective multilateralism as outlined in the ESS is still seen to be 
important. As the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adam Rotfeld stated, ‘in shaping Polish 
foreign policy, we act on the assumption that effective multilateralism is the key to ensuring 
world peace and stability. We shall make every effort to preserve and strengthen the multilateral 
institutions of global management, particularly the United Nations’.52 Therefore emphasis is 
placed on the adaptation of the UN to today’s security environment, particularly considering the 
political and institutional shortfalls. Poland has also sent military personnel to UN peacekeeping 
missions (see table 1). At the end of 2008 Poland had 852 personnel in UN missions, making the 
country the 26
th
 largest contributor and the 4
th
 largest contributor from the EU Member States 
behind Italy, France and Spain.
53
 However Poland’s contingent in UNIFIL has been withdrawn 
and its personnel in UNDOF have been drastically reduced. This is due to the fact that priority is 
being given to operations conducted in an EU and NATO context.
54
  
  12 
 Evidently the Poles’ multilateralism is more visible in regards to NATO. As highlighted 
in the previous section, Poland has contributed to NATO missions and most recently to the ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan, where Polish contributions have continually risen (see table 1).
55
 This 
followed Tusk’s decision to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq in 2008, which allowed the Poles 
to increase their contribution to Afghanistan. Nonetheless, as previously stated, Polish policy-
makers remain concerned about the functioning of the Article Five guarantee. Although the Poles 
are clearly operating further afield, their hard security interests remain focused on the 
neighbourhood.  
 Coupled with Polish concerns regarding Article Five as well as the strengthening of 
Russia, has been an increasing bilateralism with the US as highlighted through the purchasing of 
48 F-16s and more recently negotiations on the missile defence shield. Despite the Polish 
experience in relation to Iraq, the US represents the only country which could offer the Poles 
another security guarantee. Evidently Polish participation in the previous missile defence shield 
plans had more to do with this than with any potential nuclear threat from Iran which is coupled 
with concern as to whether their European partners accept a Russian sphere of influence in the 
region.
56
 However in line with the Poles’ more realistic approach to the US, they wanted 
something in return for their loyalty. In this instance the current government under the leadership 
of Donald Tusk pushed for more US investment in the modernisation of the Polish armed 
forces.
57
 This was incorporated into the declaration on strategic cooperation between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Poland, which also states that ‘the United States is 
committed to the security of Poland’.58  
Nonetheless, following the election of Barack Obama as US President in November 2008, 
there are increasing concerns that the US is losing interest in the region, which was of particular 
concern in the aftermath of the 2009 Georgian war. This was the subject of an open letter to the 
Obama Administration from senior east European politicians and intellectuals in July 2009.
59
 
These included former Polish Presidents Lech Wałęsa and Aleksander Kwasniewski, former 
Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld, 
who was involved in the drafting of the letter. It called for the strengthening of relations with the 
US, particularly as a new generation is coming to office which has not experienced 
totalitarianism and does not feel as indebted to the US as the previous generation.
60
 In relation to 
missile defence, the letter stated that it had become ‘a symbol of America’s credibility and 
commitment to the region. How it is handled could have a significant impact on their future 
transatlantic orientation. (...) Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in 
it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United 
States across the whole region’.61 Essentially the signatories underlined that nothing involving the 
Central and Eastern European countries should be done without first consulting them. Whilst it 
should be remembered that the Polish signatories are former leaders, it certainly underlines some 
Polish concerns, particularly among the older generation. In fact Polish President, Lech 
Kaczyński has come out in support of the letter.  
Following the letter, the missile defence shield was cancelled which came as no surprise 
to Warsaw. Reaction in Poland was divided with the opposition Law and Justice Party, who had 
originally agreed to the missile defence shield, accusing Tusk’s government of not doing enough 
to secure the deal and voicing concern that Poland will lose its special status in Washington. 
Additionally how and when it was communicated (via a telephone call after the first reports had 
appeared in the US media and on the 70
th
 anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland – 17 
September 2009) was not well received within Warsaw.
62
 Indeed, the concerns expressed within 
the open letter to Obama concerning being consulted, appeared to have been borne out. 
Nonetheless, the Tusk government had not made the missile defence shield a foreign policy 
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priority, although evidently military cooperation with the US is in Poland’s interest. In this 
respect, Poland expects the US to honour the declaration on strategic cooperation made in 2008.
63
  
The US did however give Poland the ‘right of first refusal’ to host SM-3 missiles (short 
range) as part of a more mobile missile defence system being planned, which the country has 
accepted. As Prime Minister Tusk highlighted during the visit of US Vice President Biden in 
October 2009, ‘the project of a new configuration of anti-missile defence is seen by Poland as 
very interesting and much needed and we are ready to participate in its implementation to an 
adequate extent’.64 Indeed Tusk also stressed the US-Polish partnership, in particular that Poland 
was an equal partner and would contribute as such and the commonality of views between the 
two countries. Defence Minister Klich also highlighted that ‘this system is as equally beneficial 
as the previous one. For us, this is an important enshrinement of the presence of our main ally on 
Polish territory. And since we have strategic partnership with the United States, the presence of 
US installations and military garrison is the confirmation of our security’.65 This deal became 
even more important when Russia conducted military exercises in neighbouring Belarus, which 
became a cause for concern in Warsaw and led to a call from Sikorski for US troops to be 
stationed in Poland.
66
 The US and Poland signed a status of forces pact in December 2009 which 
allows US troops to be stationed in the country, specifically to set up the missile system. The 
missiles will be stationed in Morąg, close to the border with Kaliningrad and was reportedly 
chosen due to logistical reasons, rather than its location.
67
 The Polish Cabinet finally signed a 
protocol in March 2010 which alters the original US-Polish missile defence shield agreement to 
the new system.  
Where does this leave Polish Atlanticism? It is clear that Poland’s importance to the US is 
decreasing, although the fact that the Obama administration came up with another missile 
defence plan within a month of cancelling the missile defence shield and invited Poland to 
participate reveals that Poland is not unimportant either. Nonetheless, when it comes to the 
country’s hard security, Polish policy-makers will still look to the US as the only country able to 
offer them a credible security guarantee. This reveals Polish scepticism regarding the reliability 
of NATO’s Article Five guarantee. Poland’s relations with the US also show that Polish policy-
makers are trying to be more realistic by extracting something in return for their commitment. In 
this respect the Poles want to be treated as an equal partner. Thus, Polish Atlanticism has been 
toned down and has become more realistic. This has however, not had much impact on how the 
country views multilateralism in hard security aspects where, as previously stated, the Poles rely 
on the Americans. Meanwhile, in terms of softer security issues, they are more likely to accept 
multilateralism. Consequently Poland remains a sceptical multilateralist even if this has 
diminished.  
 
The EU as an independent security and defence actor 
 
As highlighted above Poland’s initial sceptical reaction to ESDP meant that the policy was seen 
in the context of NATO rather than as a security policy in its own right. Thus ESDP-NATO 
compatibility took centre stage. However this stance gradually evolved as Polish accession to the 
EU contributed to a more realistic assessment of the policy and Poland’s role within it. Thus the 
aim of compatibility developed into the need to ensure that ESDP did not mount a challenge to 
NATO’s supremacy in hard security tasks. Since accession Poland has become increasingly 
involved in ESDP, including in military missions in the Congo and Chad, the Battlegroup 
Concept as well as a desire to contribute to the Gendarmerie forces and to develop the EU’s 
capabilities through the European Defence Agency. Indeed as the rationality behind ESDP 
became clearer, in particular that ESDP would not undermine NATO’s Article Five guarantee, 
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the Poles were able to accept the policy as a value added tool in the civil-military dimension, 
including humanitarian tasks. As the Undersecretary of State for Defence Policy, Stanisław 
Komorowski stated ‘some specialisation has already started to develop: NATO concentrating on 
high-intensity military operations, while the EU focusing mainly on civilian missions and lower-
intensity military operations. Such a burdensharing has a promising potential’.68  
Polish policy-makers also became accepting of permanent structured cooperation, which 
was finally included in the Lisbon Treaty. As Klich pointed out, ‘the concept that was endorsed 
in the end, and which is laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, was made more flexible and enlarged. 
And so we are now an ardent supporter of the idea. Poland is willing and is a candidate for 
participation from the start-up of implementation’.69 This highlights the importance of inclusion, 
both as a guiding principle and also to ensure that Poland’s interests are represented.  
Whereas previously the EU was seen in the context of providing social, political and 
economic stability and NATO as providing security, this stance has weakened. In line with the 
Poles’ Atlanticist stance, Polish policy-makers want to ensure that ESDP stays on an Atlanticist 
track and thus they are keen to promote EU-NATO relations. Poland’s focus is on making sure 
that ESDP develops in line with the country’s own security and defence policy and by consensus 
of all Member States, thus emphasising inclusiveness. As such, the country has moved from a 
sceptical position towards supporting the EU as an independent security and defence actor within 
the civil-military realm. This is put in the context of promoting EU-NATO compatibility 
wherever possible.  
 
Poland’s evolving leadership role: active participant and a potential military leader? 
 
Evidently, prior to enlargement, Poland could only participate in ESDP missions and therefore no 
leadership role was possible. Instead, any leadership aspirations were directed towards regional 
cooperation in Eastern Europe. The Poles’ role as promoter of regional cooperation has continued 
after enlargement as highlighted more recently by the Eastern dimension, a policy which was 
initiated by Poland and Sweden. As the Polish 2007 Security Strategy states ‘we shall focus our 
attention especially on measures the aim of which is to increase the EU’s active role in Eastern 
Europe’.70 This activeness in the region highlights the Poles’ roles as territorial defender ‘plus’ 
and a reliable ally as well as fitting into Polish threat perceptions regarding Russia. However 
Polish policy-makers downplay any leadership role in the region. As the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Adam Rotfeld stated ‘our partners have had an opportunity to become convinced that 
Poland does not treat the region as a base for its political ambitions at the EU forum. Nor do we 
make pretensions to playing the role of a regional leader’.71 Instead the Poles prefer to act as a 
facilitator.
72
 This does not mean however that Polish policy-makers will sit on the sidelines. As 
Sikorski states ‘after 20 years of successful system transformation and integration with the 
Western structures, Poland takes its deserved place among the leading players of the European 
league’.73 Nonetheless the emphasis is on bringing initiatives to the table, particularly concerning 
the Eastern dimension as opposed to leading other countries within the neighbourhood.  
Polish policy-makers’ facilitating role is more connected to the wider Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). In relation to ESDP, Poland is an ‘active participant’ rather than a 
leader, particularly in the political aspects, although the previous government did announce the 
idea of a ‘euroarmy’ comprising of 100,000 troops. This idea was seen as completely unfeasible 
for a number of reasons including duplication with NATO, the command structure which would 
see the president of the European Commission as the commander-in-chief and the subordination 
of the force under NATO.
74
 Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the idea amongst EU Member 
States, this does underline the Poles’ focus on NATO. Essentially, Polish policy-makers wanted 
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to ensure that ESDP stayed on an Atlanticist track and thus they played the role of advocate of 
EU-NATO relations. This was stressed in the security issues that the Poles wanted to see 
adequately reflected in the 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS, which included a 
reconsideration of EU-NATO relations in addition to the eastern policy dimension and energy 
security.
75
  
It is in the military dimension of ESDP where Polish activity has been the most 
noticeable. In particular, Polish military engagement has geographically widened as previously 
stated. This activeness has been brought on by the realization that Poland’s policymakers must 
take on more responsibility not only in Poland’s immediate environment but also in other parts of 
the world, a change caused by the new security environment and Poland’s allies’ reaction to it. 
Thus whilst the Poles were not always seen to be fully contributing at the EU level due to their 
political preference for Polish-US relations and NATO,
76
 this perception is changing. Indeed 
Poland is now seen as an active and reliable contributor to ESDP missions and projects.
77
 As has 
been highlighted, Poland’s active approach within ESDP has been the product of the country’s 
accession to the EU which allowed it to fully participate in a security area affecting its interests 
and has enabled the country to begin to pursue a leadership role. This is combined with its allies’ 
reaction to the new security environment which has placed pressure on Poland to change its view 
of security.  
As Poland’s military activity within ESDP has increased, so have the tasks that the Poles 
have had to undertake. In EUFOR RD Congo, the Poles were charged with protecting the 
headquarters at Kinshasa. Meanwhile, their role in the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission two years 
later was far more complex. The mission has been logistically challenging for the Poles as Polish 
troops had to build up their camp in a territory with no infrastructure in addition to the difficulties 
in transporting equipment to the operational area.
78
 However the mission is seen as an 
opportunity to acquire knowledge of how EU-led operations are run which can impact positively 
on Polish training procedures.
79
 The Poles’ increased involvement in ESDP can also be 
highlighted in relation to the EU Battlegroup Concept which enables smaller or poorer Member 
States to take on the role of Framework Nation which they could not otherwise do with larger 
types of ESDP missions. In Poland’s case, the country is participating in a Polish, German, 
Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak Battlegroup on standby in the first half of 2010, a Weimar 
Triangle Battlegroup comprising of Poland, France and Germany, which will be on standby in 
2013 and a Visegrad Four (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) plus Ukraine 
Battlegroup in 2015. Not only does this show an increase in participation from 2010 onwards but 
interestingly, Poland is the Framework Nation for all three Battlegroups, highlighting the Poles’ 
interest in a military leadership role, although the country still faces restrictions due to their lack 
of military capabilities.  
In ESDP, Poland’s actions back up the statements made in official documentation. For 
example the 2009 Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland underlines that the state of 
cooperation in ESDP ‘is a determinant of European integration in a broad sense. At its root lies a 
desire to ensure peace, stability and greater prosperity for European Union Member States and of 
its neighbours. Rapid reaction forces engaged in military operations and the conceptual 
development of the EU Battlegroups in which Poland takes an active part serve this purpose’.80  
While Poland can be seen as both an ‘active participant’ and a potential military leader, which 
complements their emphasis on nothing about us without us and an increased desire to influence 
the direction of ESDP, their lack of military capabilities can be seen as a hindrance to acquiring a 
greater role. Thus the Poles also underline that they ‘will support and will be actively involved in 
further development of the European Defence Agency, regarding it as a basic centre of 
stimulation and coordination of the development of capabilities and of the European defence 
  16 
market’.81 A more capable Poland will certainly enhance the capabilities and development of 
ESDP.  
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This article has highlighted that three main causes of change have impacted upon Poland’s role 
conceptions, causing incremental change and subsequently affecting Poland’s perception of and 
role within ESDP. These are the changing international situation which has brought to the fore 
new security threats; international reaction to these, which has increased international 
expectations on Poland to alter its security thinking and to increase its role and finally Poland’s 
accession to the EU which has enabled the country to pursue its security and defence interests.  
This has in turn caused conflict between Polish role conceptions, particularly as some 
roles are pre-eminent which has caused adaptation in less central roles. First Polish policy-
makers’ emphasis on ‘nothing about us without us’ involving the ability to be included in 
decisions affecting the country’s interests, has conflicted with their more narrowly defined threat 
perceptions and where, when and how force should be used, pushing the boundaries of the latter. 
Second Polish policy-makers’ sceptical but pragmatic view concerning multilateralism contrasts 
with the country’s desire to be an active participant and in some cases leader. However, as ESDP 
concentrates on civil-military tasks this sceptical stance is lessened as this relates to the inability 
of international organisations to protect the country’s hard security interests. Finally, a conflict 
has emerged between the Poles’ territorial defender ‘plus’ role and their proactive view on the 
use of force and reliable ally roles. The new security environment has not only seen a shift in 
emphasis on the security tasks that are likely to be carried out but also on the expectations that 
have been placed on larger countries such as Poland to take up their share of the security burden. 
Due to the importance of being a reliable ally, the Poles have deployed troops outside of the 
country’s immediate defence interests both within an EU and NATO context.  
The country’s desire to be a reliable ally and thus active participant and to gain a military 
leadership role highlights the increasing salience of ESDP for Polish security and defence 
ambitions. Indeed it underlines the importance of ensuring that ESDP is inclusive, as this not only 
guarantees Member States’ more positive approach to the policy but could also facilitate the 
emergence of a commonality of view. Indeed Poland’s incremental convergence with the broad 
goals of ESDP encompassing a comprehensive global approach to security, focusing on civil-
military tasks and based on effective multilateralism and compatibility with NATO, underlines 
the potential for the emergence a European strategic culture, relating specifically to when, where 
and how the EU uses force.   
This slow convergence of views concerning ESDP does not however impinge on Polish 
Atlanticism, particularly as there are other Atlanticist EU Member States including the UK. As 
highlighted, Polish Atlanticism has become more realistic and has increasingly focused on the US 
as opposed to NATO. Whether the Poles’ confidence in NATO and its Article Five guarantee is 
regained will potentially depend on the outcome of the discussion on NATO’s new strategic 
concept. Meanwhile, whilst Polish policy-makers have a more realistic approach to relations with 
the US, Polish threat perceptions which focus on Russia, ensures the continuing importance of 
the country as Poland’s security guarantor, despite a weakening in Poland’s position since the 
election of Obama.  
Despite a seeming Europeanist turn in Poland’s security and defence policy, there are still 
areas of divergence between Poland and other EU Member States such as Germany. In particular 
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is Poland’s perception of Russia, which is shared by the Baltic States. Nonetheless, Poland’s 
concerns up to a point reflect hard security issues which would be dealt with under NATO. 
Additionally, the Poles are trying to deal constructively with Russia to try and improve relations 
which is assisted by Tusk’s more diplomatic approach in comparison to his predecessor. The 
Georgian war along with Russian military exercises in Belarus did little to assist in this process 
though. The second area of divergence concerns multilateralism. However, as long as ESDP does 
not encroach upon hard security tasks which are assigned to NATO and ESDP-NATO relations 
are promoted, the Poles will continue to support the further development of a separate security 
and defence policy at the EU level.  
The question is whether the country’s growing role within ESDP will continue to widen 
Polish threat perceptions and stance towards where force is used, the latter of which highlights 
another divergence between Polish and EU security and defence policies. In part, this will depend 
upon whether the EU actively engages in Eastern Europe and addresses Polish concerns 
regarding Russia, underlining that the Poles expect their views to be taken into consideration. 
This again is more likely to occur in consideration of the fact that a change in style under the 
Tusk government means that it is expected that Polish views will be considered more favourably 
if security and defence issues get politicised. Nonetheless, considering the divergence between 
the Member States in relation to Russia, incursion into the Russian ‘sphere of influence’ is still 
handled carefully at the EU level.  
If no further convergence occurs then a European strategic culture will at best represent 
the lowest common denominator and will fall short of the EU’s own ambitions highlighted in the 
ESS and the EU Headline Goal 2010. Further convergence will above all require political 
willingness, something which is not lacking in the Polish case. Indeed, Poland’s original 
scepticism has not just been replaced by pragmatism but also activism and potential leadership. 
As a medium sized Member State, with increasing military operational experience and political 
willingness to send Polish troops into conflict situations in areas outside of Europe, Poland’s 
value to its allies is only expected to intensify with positive implications for the development of 
ESDP.  
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